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CI Crime an	d Narcotics Center	(b)(3)	24 January 1996
olombia:	Tainted President Scor	res Antidrug Suc	ccesses
ımmary			
	n President Samper was dog epted drug trafficker fundir		t his campaign
	overnment made significan		
•	In a series of US-supported or forced the surrender of nu of the Cali drug mafia.		
•	24,000 hectares of coca, and poppy plantings.	•	dication record of over 0 hectares of opium
•	Interdiction efforts by the C deliveries of cocaine from P	_	elped reduce airborne
•	Security measures on San A drug transshipment hub, acc		•
•	A Colombian court granted year term ending in 1998.	Prosecutor General	Valdivieso a full four-
•	The Colombian legislature relegislation is weak and poss		ring a crime, but the
<i>effective</i> . Coc 1994 levels,	of Colombia's counternarce aine seizures and the number of the has not formulated strong ement.	r of drug laboratorie	s destroyed were below Despite pledges
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Decapitating the Cali Mafia	
In 1995, the Colombian Government scored significant successes again drug mafia, capturing several mafia kingpins—including Gilberto and Rodriguez Orejuela and Jose Santacruz Londono—and other top offici lieutenants. ¹	Miguel
the Cali infrastructure continuarcotics—albeit probably at reduced levels—the arrests of the top ma likely to keep the syndicate off-balance in the near term as the kingpin attention to the legal cases against them:	fia officials is
Nevertheless, the jailed Cali leaders remain in contact with their organ may be running trafficking operations from their jail cells.	izations and
	'
Jose Santacruz Londono escaped from prison on 11 January 1996. This paper addresses events in 1995.	
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Colombia: Key Arrests and Surrenders, 1995				
02 March	Jorge Rodriguez Orejuela captured in Cali.			
05 June	Cali's top Peruvian cocaine supplier, Abelardo Cachique Rivera captured in Bogota; later transported to Peru.			
09 June	Top Cali kingpin Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela captured.			
12 June	Tulio Murcillo Posada, a key element of the Cali mafia financial infrastructure, surrenders in Bogota.			
14 June	Eleven members of the mafia's security apparatus captured.			
19 June	Henry Loaiza Ceballos, reported head of Cali mafia defensive operations, surrenders in Bogota.			
24 June	Victor Patino, reportedly one of the most violent of the top Cali traffickers, surrenders in Bogota.			
04 July	Cali kingpin Jose Santacruz Londoño captured in Bogota.			
07 July	Julian Murcillo Posada, a key aide to Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela and a principal financial officer of the Cali mafia, captured in Bogota.			
08 July	Major Cali money launderer Phanor Arizabaleta surrenders.			
05 August	Carlos Espinoza, Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela's reported communications chief, arrested in Cali.			
06 August	Cali kingpin Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela captured in Cali.			
24 September	Colombian authorities capture Jose Estrada Ramirez, a senior Cali lieutenant with close ties to Miguel Rodriguez Orejuela.			

Other Positive Steps

Tough Prosecutor, Police Director Stay on the Job. In November, a Colombian court ruled that Prosecutor General Valdivieso should complete a full four-year term ending in 1998. Valdivieso has been instrumental in pursuing legal cases against top drug traffickers, and is the driving force behind investigations of politicians—






including President Samper—with alleged links to traffickers. the Cali kingpins paid several judges in an unsuccessful effort to force Valdivieso to leave office in March 1996. The drug lords probably expected that Valdivieso's successor would be more susceptible to corruption, and they may now be more preoccupied with their legal situation. In December, Bogota renewed the term of National Police Director Serrano, who led the effort to capture the Cali kingpins and has pledged to continue antidrug raids. A New Record for Aerial Eradication. Colombia eradicated 24,046 hectares of coca, and 3,971					
hectares of opium poppy plantings in					
of 20,000 hectares and was well above					
eradication was below the 1994 total of goal of 17,000 hectares. ²	31 4,070 HECK				
goal of 17,000 hectares. ² the opium spraying effort was hampered by the downing of several antidrug aircraft—resulting in the killing of					
three Colombian pilots—the resignation of several other pilots, and long periods of					
inclement weather. Bogota has pledged to continue the eradication program and to					
meet its goal of eradicating all coca and opium poppy plantings by the end of 1996.					
		_			
Counternarcotics Performance Stat	istics, 1991	to 1995			
	1995	1994	1993	1992	1991
Coca eradication (ha)	24,046	4,910	793	959	972
Opium eradication (ha)	3,971	4,676	9,821	12,858	1,156
Cocaine base seized (mt)	19.5	32	10.4	5.81	9.28
Cocaine HCL seized (mt)	21.5	30	21.76	31.92	77.07
Opium seized (mt)	0.078	0.128	0.261	0.43	
Heroin/Morphine seized (mt)	0.419	0.181	0.261	0.05	
Cocaine labs destroyed	396	560	401	224	239
Heroin/Morphine labs destroyed	11	9	10	7	. 5
Sources: INCSR, Colombian National Police).	eradication	n and seiz	cure data	supplied by	y

Interdicting Drug Flights. Colombia's military made progress in disrupting cocaine deliveries via the air bridge from Peru by strafing or seizing trafficker aircraft on the

² Colombia's goal of 17,000 hectares was based in part on the belief that Colombia had as
much as 20,000 hectares of potentially harvestable opium.

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ground. These efforts—along with similar actions in Peru—resulted in a decrease in
the number of drug flights from Peru and in the prices for coca derivatives at the
source
Thursday Traffichers! Has of San Andres Island
Thwarting Traffickers' Use of San Andres Island. heightened security measures at San Andres airport and harbor facilities resulted in
significantly decreased large-scale narcotics trafficking from the island and forced a
shift in air and maritime trafficking to Colombia's north coast. The island has been an
important transit point for aircraft and vessels transporting cocaine from Colombia to
the Caribbean and Mexico, and in March 1995 then-Defense Minister Botero publicly
announced the security measures to meet US counternarcotics requirements.
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Money Laundering Now Illegal. In June, President Samper signed Law 190, making
money laundering a crime. the law alone is
insufficient to disrupt money-laundering operations and that additional measures will
be needed.
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ota's antidrug successes in 1995 came despite a number of nurdies.

• In November, the government was considering a deal with legislators who offered to pass decrees issued under President Samper's state of


	emergency—which had been ruled unconstitutional the previous month—in exchange for help in eliminating a system of anonymous judges often used in key drug-trafficking trials.
•	In October, National Police Director Serrano, who directed operations against the kingpins, told US officials that he believed President Samper was working to have him removed from his position, in part because he was viewed as overly friendly with the United States.
•	In September—before he was granted a full, four-year term—Prosecutor General Valdivieso told that he believed the administration was trying to undermine his prosecution of the captured Cali drug lords and his investigation of the President for accepting trafficker campaign funds.
to deny the persuade hattorney al and Vasqu probably n	also said that Attorney General Vasquez worked hard to influence judges e Prosecutor General a full term—one judge resigned after failing to is colleagues to denounce Vasquez's pressure—and Samper's personal so publicly attacked Valdivieso's credibility. While Samper, his attorney, ez—who is under investigation for accepting trafficker funds—were nost interested in stalling the investigations against themselves, weakening would have undermined his efforts against drug traffickers as well.
Colombiar basis for so reaction from	s Congress also proved to be a significant obstacle. In early December, the a Senate voted to significantly dilute the illegal enrichment statute—the ome of the strongest cases against the drug lords. Only a strong negative om the Colombian public prevented the House of Representatives from the Senate's vote, which also would have effectively ended Valdivieso's
	ons of congressmen with alleged ties to drug traffickers.

SUBJECT: Colombia: Tainted President Scores Antic	lrug Successes




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